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Introduction
Successful functioning of modern society is predicated on the existence of a high degree of interpersonal trust among its members. When individuals trust one another they are more inclined to cooperate and engage in mutually beneficial exchanges, leading to higher levels of economic development (Arrow, 1972) . Cross-country comparisons suggest a strong positive link between trust and economic growth rate (Knack and Keefer, 1997) , per capita income Cahuc, 2010, 2013) and absence of excessive government regulation (Aghion et al 2010 (Aghion et al , 2011 . At a more aggregate level, absence of trust between groups of agents is considered to be one of the primary causes of the costly and persistent inter-group conflicts that punctuate human history (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014) .
Existing empirical evidence suggests that one of the important determinants of an individual's trust towards others is the level of ethnic heterogeneity of a community, city or country of residence (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007; Leigh, 2006) . People living in racially or ethnically mixed areas tend to exhibit lower levels of trust compared to those residing in ethnically homogeneous communities. The literature has also documented a negative impact of ethnic and linguistic diversity on various measures of social capital, including trust, at the country level. (Wang and Steiner, 2015) . If true, the negative relationship between heterogeneity and social capital has important implications for immigration and settlement policies in many countries that experience large inflows of migrants. It is generally agreed that the economic and social benefits of immigration outweigh the costs, but understanding the full extent of the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on trust (and social capital in general) is vital for formulating a well designed immigration policy. This paper makes several contributions to this literature by studying the issue in the Australian context. First, it uses new datasets to update existing evidence. Second, it extends the analysis along several dimensions by testing the robustness of the results to different identifying assumptions and experimenting with new measures of localised and generalised trust. Our main results largely confirm the earlier set of findings reported in Leigh (2006) . We find that in the Australian context ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity affects negatively local but not general trust. This result is robust to different identification assumptions and measures of trust that we use.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent trends on immigration in Australia and reviews existing evidence on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and trust. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 describes econometric methodology, Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Background and previous literature
After the official adoption of a multicultural immigration policy, Australia has implemented an expansive immigration policy, welcoming migrants from many diverse backgrounds (OECD 2006) . Since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the percentage of the Australian population born overseas has increased from approximately 9.8% in 1947 to approximately 27.7% at June 30, 2013 30, (ABS 2013 Phillips, Klapdor & Simon-Davies 2010) .
Furthermore, the vast majority of overseas born Australian residents in 1947 were born in countries that were ethnically or culturally very similar to Australia, with 78.6% of the overseas born population hailing from the United Kingdom, Ireland, or New Zealand. In 2011, this figure had fallen to approximately 28.9%. Australia's ethnic diversity has thus increased not only as a result of a larger intake of migrants, but also as a result of a more diverse intake. The presence of second and third generation migrants with a greater range of cultural and ancestral backgrounds also contributes to Australia's vibrant diversity, notwithstanding the 'melting pot' effect of inter-cultural interaction. With a reduction in Australia's fertility rate over time (Barnes 2001 ) and the continued increase in immigration levels, this trend looks set to continue. This increase in ethnic diversity can and arguably has provided tremendous cultural and economic benefits, including productive gains from diversity and increased levels of aggregate demand.
What is the effect of this increasing ethnic diversity on social capital and, in particular, on interpersonal trust? Leigh (2006) was the first study to provide empirical evidence on this issue for Australia. Using data from the 1997-98 Australian Community Survey he studied the effect of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity and income inequality on the generalized and localized trust and found that heterogeneity has a negative impact on both measures of trust. When instrumenting ethnic heterogeneity of the neighborhood with ethnic heterogeneity of a larger region in which it is contained he found that neighborhood level heterogeneity affects negatively only localized and not generalized trust.
This paper updates and extends Leigh (2006) results in several ways. It uses data coming from the 2006 and 2010 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The use of HILDA data enables us to analyse a more recent period during which Australia continued to experience large inflow of international migrants. More importantly, the longitudinal nature of the dataset allows us to control for individual fixed effects when estimating the effect of heterogeneity on trust and to compare these results to those obtained using cross-sectional methods such as OLS and IV. While the fixed effects model itself is not completely free from threats to internal validity in this context, we believe that comparison of the results obtained under different identifying assumptions provides an important robustness check that increases our confidence in these results.
Finally, we take advantage of a richer set of questions that can serve as proxies for generalized and localized trust available in HILDA to analyse a richer set of trust measures, compared to those typically used in the literature. We use information collected at wave 6 and 10 (years 2006 and 2010) of the HILDA survey, as questions relating to local or neighbourhood trust are only asked in those waves. Further, data on the proportion of people from different ethnic groups living in each postal code are collected from the Australian Census (see section b) and this restricts the investigation to those years in which the census takes place, or the years immediately before and after. Our final sample includes over 20,000 observations from both waves, after excluding all individuals missing information in one or more variables of interest.
Data

Outcomes
Individual trust levels are based on two separate questions asked in the survey.
Respondents are asked to nominate on a scale of 1 -7 (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agrees) the extent to which they agree with the following statements:
1. "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted" 2. "People in this neighbourhood can be trusted" These measures of trust differ from those used in the literature in a number of key ways.
Firstly, the HILDA questions allow for a differentiation between 'generalised' trust and 'localised' trust. Of the surveyed literature, only Leigh (2006) , Sturgis et al (2011) and Putnam (2007) allow for this distinction, though other papers allude to the differences in generalised morality and closer, kinship-based morality (Tabellini 2010; Algan and Cahuc 2010) . Secondly, the question relating to general trust is worded differently to that usually found in most studies. The World Value Survey and the US General Social Survey ask respondents "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful when dealing with others?" Responses are either "Most people can be trusted" or "Need to be very careful". Lastly, the format of the HILDA questions allows for trust to be measured on a continuum from 1 to 7, and the magnitude of the effect of certain individual and community characteristics can be more accurately ascertained.
We test our main findings by using some alternative measures of trust, based on different questions asked in HILDA, in order to consider various ways of assessing and expressing trust (see for example Glaeser et al., 2000 and Soroka et al., 2007 for a discussion of the potential problems in measuring trust in surveys). The extent to which an individual agrees to the following statements will be used as an alternative measure for general trust:
1. "Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance." 2. "Most people you meet keep their word."
3. "Most people you meet make agreements honestly."
The extent to which an individual agrees to the following statements will be used as an alternative measure for local trust:
1. "This is a close-knit neighbourhood." 2. "People in this neighbourhood generally do not get along."
3. "People in this neighbourhood generally do not share the same values." Table 1 reports sample mean values and standard deviations for the different measures of trust. Each of these values falls within a range of 1 to 7. There is a consistent increase in levels of trust (or decrease in perception of untrustworthiness) between 2006 and 2010, though the magnitude is negligible in some cases. General trust levels are higher than local trust levels. Respondents are more likely to report that they trust other individuals in their local area than they are to report that they get along with, or share the same values, with other individuals in their local area. 
Ethnic diversity
In our study, we use community characteristics data from the Australian Census of Population and Housing (the 'Census'). The Census is a survey conducted every five years, the principal purpose of which is to determine the number and characteristics of people and dwellings in Australia on census night. For every resident of every postcode there is a record of ethnicity based on country of birth and a record of ancestry based on country of parent's birth (ABS, 2006; . An individual is considered to belong to an ancestral group where at least one of that individual's parents was born in that ancestral group's home country. For this reason, an individual can belong to two ancestral groups. The census similarly records a 'Language Spoken at Home' for every individual in every postcode. Following the literature, (Leigh 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) we construct Herfindahl indices of neighbourhood fractionalisation based on ethnicity, ancestry, and language spoken at home. These indices measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the neighbourhood population will have different ethnicities, ancestral backgrounds, and language preferences respectively.
The indices are created according to the following formula: 
Other explanatory variables
We estimate several versions of our main model, progressively increasing the set of independent variables. The choice of independent variables follows the literature and includes: marital and employment status, education level, region of residence, family disposable income, and an index of socio-economic deprivation calculated in HILDA (Summerfield et al 2012) . Table 2 lists the variables used in the analysis. Our set of control variables includes some important characteristics that have been omitted in previous studies (Leigh, 2006; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007) , such as whether the individual lives in urban or rural area. This is an important control variable that can be related with trust and diversity. Urban neighbourhoods are much more likely than rural neighbourhoods to be ethnically or linguistically diverse. If it is the case that individuals from urban neighbourhoods are also systematically more or less trusting than individuals from rural neighbourhoods, then this will be an important source of omitted variable bias in previous studies. Lastly, we include information on residential tenure. A higher residential tenure should increase familiarity among the individual and the individual's neighbours, thereby increasing trust. or respondents belong to the two lowest deciles of the socio-economic status distribution. 
Methodology and Estimation
We start with a simple linear model relating trust to various fractionalisation measures at the neighborhood level:
(1) Where:
is the extent to which individual in neighbourhood trusts others, either in a broad general sense or in a strict local sense.
is a vector of the characteristics of individual .
is a vector of the characteristics of neighbourhood .
is a measure of the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation of neighbourhood .
The parameter of interest in the above model is , which provides an estimate of the effect of neighbourhood heterogeneity on individual trust level. The neighbourhood is defined as the area represented by a single postal code in the Australian Census. A range of specifications will be presented so as to separately estimate the effect of neighbourhood diversity on general trust and on local trust. Alternative measures of neighbourhood diversity will be used and the effect of ethnic fractionalisation will be compared to the effect of linguistic fractionalisation. The model will be estimated by OLS separately for the years 2006 and 2010.
Estimation by OLS could be biased if we are not controlling for variables that are jointly correlated with neighbourhood trust and neighbourhood heterogeneity. Following Leigh (2006) and Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) , we include a number of individual and neighbourhood level control variables, such as gender, education levels, income levels, and neighbourhood socio-economic status, as well as some additional characteristics available in HILDA that might have an effect on trust, such as individual cultural background and status as a rural or urban resident. This strategy however cannot account for the unobservable individual characteristics that are jointly correlated with trust levels and neighbourhood diversity. These unobservable characteristics cannot be included as control variables in an OLS model and might bias the results.
One way to overcome the endogeneity bias in this context is to instrument neighbourhood level heterogeneity with that of a larger region (local statistical area) containing that neighbourhood, as was done in Leigh (2006) . The validity of this instrument is based on the assumption that individuals can move between neighbourhoods but are constrained to remain within the larger region. It turns out that in our sample, IV results were quite similar to those obtained from the OLS estimation, thus we report them only briefly in the results section.
Finally, to account for individual unobserved traits and characteristics that do not vary over time, we can control for the individual fixed effects by estimating the following model:
( 2) where γ is an individual fixed effect that takes into account time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The parameter of interest in this model is identified by the changes in the diversity of that individual's neighbourhood. Thus there are two possible sources of identification in the model: (i) changes in the ethnic composition of a given neighbourhood over time, and (ii) moves of a given individual between different neighbourhoods. One reason to be concerned about this distinction is the possibility of endogenous mobility: decisions to move or stay in a given neighbourhood might be motivated by the preferences for ethnic heterogeneity. For example neighbourhood diversity might have a negative effect on trust for a relatively small portion of individuals in the population, but those individuals are more likely to change neighbourhoods. In this case, if the model is identified by movers, the estimates will be valid for that sub-population, but might overstate the average effect for the population. On the other hand, stayers might be comprised of individuals who are indifferent to the ethnic composition of neighbourhood. If the identifying variation comes from stayers we might expect that the estimates will understate the average effect. To further investigate this issue we will estimate the model separately on the sample of movers and stayers and compare the results to those obtained in the combined sample.
Another potential limitation of a fixed effects model in this context concerns time-specific shocks. Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) find that shocks or traumatic experiences, such as divorce or financial misfortune, negatively affect how trusting an individual is. Since a fixed effect model can only eliminate time-invariant characteristics, the presence of random timevarying shocks can produce biased estimates. If individuals experience trust affecting shocks between the two periods, and the shock coincides with or motivates changes in neighbourhood diversity, the model may incorrectly attribute the change in trust to the change in neighbourhood diversity. For example a negative income shock might reduce an individual's trust and necessitate a move to a low-income neighbourhood. This might generate spurious correlation between trust and diversity if income and diversity are negatively correlated at the neighbourhood level. Even though diversity and income are not correlated in our sample, and we are able to control for the observable shocks, one might still be concerned about the role of unobservable time specific shocks. Mitigating this potential limitation to some degree, Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) find that the effects of such shocks typically endure for less than a year, so only shocks occurring close to either survey will be likely to have an effect on trust levels, and the chances of these shocks simultaneously affecting neighbourhood diversity levels are reasonably low.
Results
This section presents the main empirical findings of the investigation into the effect of neighbourhood heterogeneity on individual trust formation. Results will first be presented for the OLS model, followed by the IV and Fixed Effects model. Table 4 presents the results from the OLS regression with general trust as a dependent variable and Table 5 presents Indigenous Australians trust on average 4.6% less than the sample mean in 2006 and 6% less than the sample mean in 2010. A similar effect is observed for migrants. Migrants have less general trust than non-migrants. Being a migrant also decreases local trust, although the effect is weaker in the 2006 sample and loses statistical significance in 2010 sample. These findings could plausibly be explained by the enduring effect of culture on trust levels. Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Tabellini (2008) find that trust levels among migrants are highly correlated with the migrant's country of birth. Similarly, the endurance of cultural 'shocks' such as those described by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) might explain the reduced disposition to trust among an Indigenous population subjected to widespread trauma and injustice in recent history. It is perhaps not surprising that this effect is more pronounced for general trust levels than local trust levels. Repeated interaction and familiarity at the local level might promote trust within local communities, but overarching cultural norms might prevent the formation of higher levels of general trust. Table 4 here Table 5 here
The preferred specification of the model includes many observable variables that might be a determinant of trust levels such as, for example, the urban binary variable, household income, and educational attainment. However it is possible that the effect of neighbourhood diversity on levels of trust is introduced by individuals from low trust cultural backgrounds. Since migrants are shown to partially retain the cultural norms of their home countries , it's possible that migrants from certain cultural backgrounds will have higher or lower levels of trust than the existing population. Migrants are more likely to be found in high diversity areas. This might mean that the correlation between diversity and trust might not be interpreted causally because the binary indicator variable of 'migrant' might not be precise or powerful enough to properly control for this phenomenon.
For this reason, a sensitivity test has been run, where the OLS model is respecified, first to include a binary variable for the country of birth of each respondent and then to include an indicator of the 'region' of birth which allows for greater precision in the estimates where some countries are represented by very few respondents. The complete results are available on request and are very similar to the ones reported above and do not seem to be driven by the presence of individuals from particular backgrounds in more diverse neighbourhoods. Table 6 , 7 and 8 report the results for the IV model. The underlying identification assumption in this specification is that individuals are more or less constrained within larger regions by work, family and social ties and therefore the ethnic fractionalisation of a larger region can be used as an instrument for the ethnic or linguistic fractionalisation of smaller regions.
The dependent variable for Table 7 is general trust, and for Table 8 Table 6 reports the coefficient of the chosen instrument in the first stage regressions. The F-statistic is also presented. The columns match those reported for the second stage regressions. In all cases, the instrument -ethnic heterogeneity of the larger region -is shown to be relevant and significant. Table 6 here Table 7 here Table 8 here The results from the Fixed Effects model are presented in Table 9 . Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results from the fixed effects model using general trust as the dependent variable. The distinction between columns is the same as previously reported, with columns 1 and 2 using ethnic fractionalisation and column 3 using linguistic fractionalisation as the explanatory variable of interest. Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat the specifications from the previous three importance of the two sources of identification we will run separate regressions on two subsamples; the movers and the stayers. If the effect of diversity on trust is systematically different for movers relative to stayers, the coefficients estimated for the two distinct subsamples should be significantly different. Table 10 presents the results of this analysis.
Column 1 shows the results for the same fixed effect model estimated in Table 9 (column 5), for ease of comparison. Column 2 repeats the estimation using only the subsample of stayers. This has the effect of dropping certain variables from the regression such as the urban dummy since the source of identifying variation is lost. Column 3 performs the same regression on the subsample of movers only.
Table 10 here
The interpretation of the table above is that the fixed effects results are not substantially different for those individuals who changed neighbourhoods between the two waves and those who did not. The magnitude and direction of the effect of ethnic fractionalisation is consistent with the other estimations. The lower level of significance can be attributed the relatively slow evolution of a neighbourhood's ethnic fractionalisation in such a short period of time which results in a relatively small variation in the fractionalisation index between the two censuses. The results are largely mirrored for the effect of linguistic fractionalisation, though the estimator in column 2 drops to practically zero. This can again be attributed to a lack of precision and estimation power in the data. Unlike the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on local trust, the coefficients for linguistic fractionalisation differ between the movers and the stayers. The effect is larger for the subsample of movers relative to the whole-of-sample effect. This implies that the effect of linguistic diversity effect is driven primarily by movers. The magnitude of the effect is as high as 15% of a standard deviation. Glaeser et al (2000) has underlined that one of the limitations of survey data is the difficulty of getting reliable measures of how trusting individuals are. For this reason, the fixed effects model is re-specified with alternative measures or proxies for general and local used as the dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 11 . A coefficient is reported for both ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation for each measure of trust. Each column represents a different dependent variable as follows. Whether the question is intended as an alternative to general or local trust is reported in parentheses:
Alternative measures of trust
1. "Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance." (General) 2. "Most people you meet keep their word." (General) 3. "Most people you meet make agreements honestly." (General) 4. "This is a close-knit neighbourhood." (Local) 5. "People in this neighbourhood generally do not get along." (Local) 6. "People in this neighbourhood generally do not share the same values." (Local)
Table 11 here
The results reported in table 11 generally support the conclusions drawn from the previous models that used the more direct questions regarding trust as the dependent variables. The effect of neighbourhood ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity on the general trust proxies is not significantly different from zero. Ethnic fractionalisation has a significant and consistently negative relationship with perceptions of local community togetherness, noting questions five and six are framed such that a positive coefficient is indicative of a negative perception of the neighbourhood. The effect for questions 5 and 6 are consistent with or slightly larger than the reported effect on local trust, though the effect reported under column 4 is noticeably larger. When linguistic fractionalisation is considered as the explanatory variable of interest, a broadly similar story emerges, though the effect is lessened by approximately one to one and half percentage points across the three local trust proxies.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of general and local trust in Australia using a variety of econometric techniques and identifying assumptions. The results are uniform across practically all specifications and indicate that neighbourhood level diversity affects local trust but has no effect on general trust. These results are consistent with the findings reported in Leigh (2006) who used data from the 1990s. In all specifications, an increase in neighbourhood diversity is associated with a decrease in local trust, for both ethnic and linguistic diversity. The estimated effect remains consistent when the IV and fixed effects models are used. Neighbourhood ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity is among the most important determinants of trust identified in the models. There is no consistent evidence of the effect of neighbourhood diversity on general trust. The relationship appears to be significant in some of the OLS specifications; however the fixed effects model, using the combined longitudinal sample, produces coefficient estimates that are not significantly different to zero. As such, the more credible identification strategies, IV and fixed effects, tend to suggest that neighbourhood diversity does not in fact have any significant effect on general trust levels. Overall our results indicate that while the negative effects of ethnic diversity on trust in Australia are relatively limited there might exist a scope for government policy aimed at lowering cultural barriers in ethnically diverse areas Tables   Table 1 -Trust variables   2006 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Indigenous Australian 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Indigenous Australian -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.005* 0.005* (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) Population (1000) -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.003* (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Urban 0.027 0.035 -0.280*** -0.304*** (0.067) (0.064) (0.086) (0.082) Wave 6 -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.071*** -0.096*** -0.047** (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) Constant 4.913*** 5.003*** 5.012*** 5.312*** 4.831*** 4.598*** (0 
